



**POL41820: CHALLENGES TO ACCOUNTABILITY
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
COURSE SYLLABUS**

Module Coordinator: Dr. Eva Wegner
eva.wegner@ucd.ie
Office: F305, Newman Building
Phone Extension: 8614
Office Hours: Thursdays from 2-4 p.m. or by appointment

Lectures: Mondays, 4-6 p.m., G317 (SPIRe Seminar Room), Newman Building

Contents

I. Module Description & Learning Outcomes	1
II. Short Overview.....	2
III. Sessions.....	2
Part I: Challenges to Accountability	2
Part II: Initiatives to Overcome Challenges	3
Part III: Class Projects.....	4
IV. Assessment Policy:	4
V. Reading list (includes additional recommended readings).....	5

I. Module Description & Learning Outcomes

Welcome to Pol41820: Challenges to accountability in developing countries!

In many developing countries, the poor suffer from unresponsive public officials. Because poor citizens often lack the ability to punish under-performing politicians or public service providers, they may receive bad public services in terms of education, health care, and general infrastructure such as access to decent sanitation. Solving accountability problems has increasingly become the focus of international development agencies who have come to see accountability as one of the cornerstones of good governance and successful development.

This course deals with challenges to democratic and social accountability and interventions to address these problems in developing countries. The first part of the course looks into important causes of accountability problems, such as clientelism and corruption and reviews consequences of these problems through both the academic and policy literature. The second part evaluates the success of a host of initiatives to increase accountability, such as score cards, information campaigns, or community-driven development that have taken place in countries as diverse as Brazil, Uganda, India, Colombia or the Democratic Republic of Congo.

In the third part, students will present their own accountability enhancement projects.

Learning Outcomes

- understand mechanisms of political and social accountability
- understand drivers of accountability problems
- appreciate the role accountability plays for equality and development
- assess the strength of evidence of different types of analysis
- basic understanding of program evaluation techniques such as Randomized Control Trials (RCTs)
- enhanced presentation skills
- increased familiarity with databases and data on political and social accountability

II. Short Overview

Session	Date	Topic
1	23/01/17	Introduction
2	30/01/17	Information Asymmetries and Citizen Disengagement
3	06/02/17	Clientelism
4	13/02/17	Corruption
5	20/02/17	Field Experiments
6	27/02/17	Score Cards
7	06/03/17	Information Campaigns (1)
	BREAK	
8	27/03/17	Information Campaigns (2)
9	03/04/17	Community Participation
10	10/04/17	Group Projects 1
11	17/04/17	Public Holiday
11&12	24/04/17	Group Projects 2, Evaluation

III. Sessions

Part I: Challenges to Accountability

Session 1: Introductory Session

- What is accountability?
- Why is accountability important for development?
- What is this course about?
 - Presentation of Syllabus
 - Course Model, Assignments, Rules

Session 2: Information Asymmetries and Citizen Disengagement

Readings

- Kitschelt, H., 2011. Democratic accountability: Situating the empirical field of research and its frontiers. *Unpublished manuscript, Duke University, Durham, NC.*
<https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/files/2014/12/Kitschelt.pdf>

- Keefer, P. and Khemani, S., 2005. Democracy, public expenditures, and the poor: understanding political incentives for providing public services. *The World Bank Research Observer*, 20(1), pp.1-27.
- Bratton, M. and Logan, C., 2006. Voters but not yet citizens: the weak demand for vertical accountability in Africa's unclaimed democracies. <http://afrobarometer.org/publications/wp63-voters-not-yet-citizens-weak-demand-vertical-accountability-africas-unclaimed>

Session 3: Clientelism

Readings:

- Hicken, A., 2011. Clientelism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 14, pp.289-310.
- Wantchekon, L., 2003. Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in Benin. *World politics*, 55(03), pp.399-422.

Practical Exercise:

- Databases and representing data on voter knowledge, disaffection, and clientelism

Session 4: Corruption

Readings

- Svensson, J., 2005. Eight questions about corruption. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 19(3), pp.19-42.
- Brusco, V., Nazareno, M. and Stokes, S.C., 2004. Vote buying in Argentina. *Latin American Research Review*, 39(2), pp.66-88.

Practical Exercise:

- Databases and representing data on corruption

Session 5: Lecture on Field Experiments

Part II: Initiatives to Overcome Challenges

Session 6: Scorecard based campaign

Readings

- Gullo, S., Galavotti, C. and Altman, L., 2016. A review of CARE's Community Score Card experience and evidence. *Health policy and planning*, 31(10), pp.1467-1478.
- Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J., 2012. Policing politicians: citizen empowerment and political accountability in Uganda preliminary analysis. *Columbia Universities. Unpublished manuscript*.
- OR Grossman, G. and Michelitch, K., 2016. *Information Dissemination and Politician Performance between Elections. A Field Experiment in Uganda*. Working Paper.

Exercise on scorecards

Session 7: Information Campaigns about Performance and General Political Knowledge

Readings

1. Fujiwara, T. and Wantchekon, L., 2013. Can informed public deliberation overcome clientelism? Experimental evidence from Benin. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 5(4), pp.241-255.
2. Bidwell, K., Casey, K., Glennerster, R. and J-PAL, J.P.S.G., 2015. The Impact of Voter Knowledge Initiatives in Sierra Leone. *AEA RCT Registry*. <https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/26>.

Exercise on Information Campaigns

Session 8: Information Campaigns about Corruption

Readings

- Ferraz, C. and Finan, F., 2008. Exposing corrupt politicians: the effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2), pp.703-745.
- Reinikka, R. and Svensson, J., 2005. Fighting corruption to improve schooling: Evidence from a newspaper campaign in Uganda. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 3(2- 3), pp.259-267.

Exercise on Corruption Campaigns

Session 9: Citizen Participation

Readings

- Touchton, M. and Wampler, B., 2014. Improving social well-being through new democratic institutions. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(10), pp.1442-1469.
- Humphreys, M., de la Sierra, R.S. and Van der Windt, P., 2012. Social and Economic Impacts of Tuungane. *Final Report on the Effects of a Community Driven Reconstruction Program in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo*, New York: Columbia University.

Discuss Problems with Class Projects

Part III: Class Projects

Session 10: Class Projects (1) → 2-3 Projects

Session 11/12: Class Projects (2), and Closing Lecture, Evaluation

IV. Assessment Policy:

*****NOTICE THAT THIS IS DIFFERENT FROM GRADEBOOK*****

1. 20 % **ACTIVE** participation: active participation means that you
 - a. come to class prepared (i.e. having read the material) and
 - b. contribute to the discussion in a constructive and meaningful way.
 - c. to get the full grade, you should at the very least make one substantive contribution in each class, on average; the best way to go about this is to think about questions relating to the readings before each class.
 - d. if you just attend class without contributing to the discussion, your participation grade will be C.
2. 20 % paper presentation:
 - a. you are expected to present one of the readings in this seminar to your class, please consult <http://www.macartan.nyc/teaching/discuss/> for information as to how to review and discuss a paper
 - b. you need to prepare slides for your presentation
 - c. your presentation should include two points for discussion. The usefulness of the discussion points counts towards your grade.
 - d. Your presentation is expected to last about 20 minutes.
3. 30 % class project. This is a team effort.
 - a. Your class project is an accountability campaign in country X. Your project is supposed to

- i. Detect an accountability problem in a country (that could be related to political officials, but also to public servants); in your presentation, you should explain how you identified the problem
 - ii. Design a campaign to improve the status quo. In the readings, there will be a lot of inspiration as to how this could look like. The campaign could focus on different types of people (i.e. both the provider/officials/ and the consumers/ voters).
 - iii. Include some thoughts as to how you could measure whether your campaign worked.
 - b. **all members of the team will receive the same grade**
 - c. it's your responsibility to ensure that the other students contribute to the outcome in a fairly equal way
4. 30 % term paper of around 5000 words (excluding references). This term paper could ideally be based on your class project (i.e. it may also be a group endeavor); if you want to write about another topic, please contact me to discuss the suitability of the topic. **Deadline 19 May 2017**

V. Reading list (includes additional recommended readings)

Afridi, F., 2008. Can community monitoring improve the accountability of public officials?. *Economic and political weekly*, pp.35-40.

Bidwell, K., Casey, K., Glennerster, R. and J-PAL, J.P.S.G., 2015. The Impact of Voter Knowledge Initiatives in Sierra Leone. *AEA RCT Registry*. [https://www. socialscienceregistry. org/trials/26](https://www.socialscienceregistry.org/trials/26).

Bratton, M. and Logan, C., 2006. Voters but not yet citizens: the weak demand for vertical accountability in Africa's unclaimed democracies. <http://afrobarometer.org/publications/wp63-voters-not-yet-citizens-weak-demand-vertical-accountability-africas-unclaimed>

Brusco, V., Nazareno, M. and Stokes, S.C., 2004. Vote buying in Argentina. *Latin American Research Review*, 39(2), pp.66-88.

Devarajan, S. and Widlund, I. eds., 2007. *The Politics of Service Delivery in Democracies: better access for the poor*. Expert Group on Development Issues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Ferraz, C. and Finan, F., 2008. Exposing corrupt politicians: the effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2), pp.703-745.

Fujiwara, T. and Wantchekon, L., 2013. Can informed public deliberation overcome clientelism? Experimental evidence from Benin. *American Economic Journal: Applied Economics*, 5(4), pp.241-255.

Grossman, G. and Michelitch, K., 2016. *Information Dissemination and Politician Performance between Elections. A Field Experiment in Uganda*. Working Paper.

Gullo, S., Galavotti, C. and Altman, L., 2016. A review of CARE's Community Score Card experience and evidence. *Health policy and planning*, 31(10), pp.1467-1478.

Hicken, A., 2011. Clientelism. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 14, pp.289-310.

Humphreys, M. and Weinstein, J., 2012. Policing politicians: citizen empowerment and political accountability in Uganda preliminary analysis. *Columbia Universities. Unpublished manuscript*.

Humphreys, M., de la Sierra, R.S. and Van der Windt, P., 2012. Social and Economic Impacts of Tuungane. *Final Report on the Effects of a Community Driven Reconstruction Program in Eastern Democratic Republic of Congo*, New York: Columbia University.

Keefner, P. and Khemani, S., 2005. Democracy, public expenditures, and the poor: understanding political incentives for providing public services. *The World Bank Research Observer*, 20(1), pp.1-27.

Kitschelt, H., 2011. Democratic accountability: Situating the empirical field of research and its frontiers. *Unpublished manuscript, Duke University, Durham, NC.*
<https://sites.duke.edu/democracylinkage/files/2014/12/Kitschelt.pdf>

McNeil, Mary; Malena, Carmen. 2010. *Demanding Good Governance : Lessons from Social Accountability Initiatives in Africa.* World Bank. © World Bank. <https://openknowledge-worldbank-org.ucd.idm.oclc.org/handle/10986/2478> License: CC BY 3.0 IGO.”

Reinikka, R. and Svensson, J., 2005. Fighting corruption to improve schooling: Evidence from a newspaper campaign in Uganda. *Journal of the European Economic Association*, 3(2- 3), pp.259-267.

Svensson, J., 2005. Eight questions about corruption. *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 19(3), pp.19-42.

Touchton, M. and Wampler, B., 2014. Improving social well-being through new democratic institutions. *Comparative Political Studies*, 47(10), pp.1442-1469.

Wantchekon, L., 2003. Clientelism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in Benin. *World politics*, 55(03), pp.399-422.

World Bank. 2003. *World Development Report 2004 : Making Services Work for Poor People.* World Bank. © World Bank. <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5986>